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ABSTRACT 
ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE AND FINANCIAL MARKET PERFORMANCE: 
A PRELIMINARY TEST 
This paper builds on the M-form hypothesis of Williamson (1975) and em-
pirical tests of it at the level of accounting data by Armour and Teece 
(1978), Teece (1981), and Steer and Cable (1978). An exploratory hypothesis 
that systematic risk will decline with the adoption of the M-form structure is 
developed. Empirical investigation suggests that this hypothesis is correct. 
Implications of this result are discussed. 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FINANCIAL MARKET PERFORMANCE: 
A PRELIMINARY TEST 
1. Introduction 
This paper presents a modest test of the importance of internal organiza-
tional structure in determining the firm's performance as reflected in the 
market value of the firm's equity. More specifically the paper aims to deter-
mine if the M-form hypothesis of Williamson (1975, Chapter 8) which posits 
superior performance for organizations adopting a particular kind of multidi-
visional structure can be extended from accounting book measures to financial 
market measures of performance. Tests by Armour and Teece (1978), Teece 
(1981) and Steer and Cable have tended to confirm this hypothesis at the level 
of accounting data. The current paper extends earlier work of Armour and 
Teece (1978) in which a sample of petroleum industry firms was used to con-
clude in support of the M-form hypothesis using accounting rates of return on 
equity. The same sample is used with data on returns and risks obtained from 
capital market substituted for the accounting returns utilized by Armour and 
Teece. 
2. The M-Form Hypothesis and the Armour and Teece Test 
Building on the work of Chandler (1962), who documented the rise of the 
multidivisional-internal-organizational structure as the response of large 
American corporations to the complexities of increased size, Williamson (1970, 
1975, 1981) developed an economic theory of organizational structure. 
Williamson observed that growing functionally organized firms inevitably en-
countered two problems with the increase in size and diversity: (1) the cumu-
l ative cont r ol loss, and (2) the confoundi ng of strategic and operating 
decision-makings. This logically led Williamson (1970, 1975) to conclude that 
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a breakdown in the effective profit-maximizing behavior would occur in 
functionally organized firms. In his view, the multidivisional (or M-form) 
organization was a logical response to this efficiency decline. 
According to Williamson an M-form organization can induce an apropriate 
goal-pursuit by divisions organized along the product, brand, or geographic 
lines. Thus, a divisional manager is given an explicit ob_iective function, 
usually a return or rate of return measure and then induced through various 
incentives (e.g., bonuses) to maximize the ob_iective function. Furthermore, 
Williamson asserts that the M-form organization separates strategic and 
operating decision-makings. He calls this separation the hierarchical decom-
position principle of organization design (Williamson, 1981, p. 1550): 
Internal organization should be designed in such a way as to effect 
quasi-independence between the parts, the high frequency dynamics 
(operating activities) and low frequency dynamics should be clearly 
distinguished and incentives should be aligned within and between 
components so as to promote both local and global effectiveness. 
Finally, Williamson suggests that M-form organizations possess superior in-
ternal information and control techniques to those possessed by the external 
capital markets. In this regard he is following the lead of Heflebower (1960) 
and Alchian (1969) though he is more positive in _iudging the efficiency of or-
ganization over the external markets. A direct result of Williamson's asser-
tions is the M-form hypothesis (1975, p. 150): 
The organization and operation of the large enterprise along the 
lines of the M-form favors goal pursuit and least-cost behavior more 
nearly associated with the neoclassical profit maximization hypothe-
sis than does the U-form (functional) organizational alternative. 
Armour and Teece (1978) tested the M-form hypothesis using a sample of 28 
petroleum firms during the period 1955-1973. The performance measure they 
used was the accounting rate of return (after taxes) on stockholders equity. 
They argued that it was appropriate to use a book value profit rate as a mea-
sure of performance: 
There is still the question of whether the above performance measure 
should reflect market or book values. The desirability of using a 
book value measure can be illustrated as follows. Consider a firm 
which has identified and pursued a market opportunity yielding a re-
turn disproportionate with the risk involved (e.g., a product or 
process innovation, or a superior internal control system). Assume 
that this above normal return is effectively isolated from competi-
tive pressure for an extended period of time (e.g., due to patent . 
protection or to a significant lead time for competitive entry into 
the relevant market). The return on the equity invested in the en-
deavor, as measured by appropriate book values, will continue to re-
flect the disproportionate return realized by the firm until compet-
itive entry has effectively eliminated it, or until the firm is sold 
and its assets are revalued, with the above normal returns being 
fully capitalized into the selling price. The capitalization of 
these returns into the value of the firm's securities will occur, 
however, at a much more rapid pace, since as soon as investors learn 
of the disproportionate return associated with the underlying 
assets, the price of the securities will be bid up to the point 
where the associated capital market return just compensates for the 
inherent risk. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to identify 
exactly when such capitalization will occur. Consequently, it seems 
that in an analysis of the efficiency characteristics of the firm, 
the use of a book value profit rate measure is appropriate. 
(pp. 109-110) 
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However, it should be pointed out that the market-value-based performance 
measure is more consistent with the objective of managers' acting in the 
shareholders' best interest. Accounting rates of return are determined mainly 
by accountants' applications of accounting rules and methods, and often in-
fluenced by changes in these rules and methods; while the market rates of re-
turn are what the shareholders actually receive from their investment. Thus, 
one can argue that the performance measures based upon the market value are 
superior to that based upon the book value. Furthermore, in a separate paper 
Teece (1978) (although choosing not to do so) argued for a market value test 
of theM-form hypothesis: 
In competitive capital markets the level of enterprise efficiency 
will be reflected in the market value of the firm. Accordingly, 
there would appear to be merit in testing the M-form hypothesis by 
examining changes in the market value of the enterprise. (p. 176) 
Armour and Teece specified for each firm the history of organization 
structure over time based on responses to a questionnaire. Basically for each 
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firm this resulted in three period: (1) an initial period in which the firm 
was organized along lines other than the M-form structure (this was usually a 
functional structure); (2) a transitional period during which the firm's 
structure was in a state of flux as it moved from one internal organizational 
form to another; and (3) a final period during which the firm was organized 
along M-form lines. 
The classification of firm structure according to these periods then be-
come one independent variable in a regression model that also included mea-
sures of size, risk, capacity utilization in the petroleum industry, and 
growth. (The dependent variable was return on equity as discussed above.) 
Cross-sectional and time-series data were pooled in estimating model 
parameters. 
Regressions were run for two sample periods: 1955-1968 and 1969-1973. 
This was done because it was argued that the earlier time period represented 
the period during which the M-form structure was being diffused and hence 
differential performance could be observed. By contrast, it was argued that 
during the latter period, the M-form structure was almost fully diffused and 
so differential performance would be difficult to discern. (This does not 
mean that individual firm adopting the M-form structure in the latter period 
did not recognize increased returns.) 
In their results Armour and Teece found "strong statistical support for 
theM-form hypothesis." They estimated that during the earlier period (1955-
1968) the M-form structure outperformed the functional structure by about two 
percentage points of return on equity, (i.e., approximately 9 1/2% versus ap-
proximately 7 1/2%). Furthermore, the superior performance of the M-form 
structure did not persist into the latter period (1969-1973). 
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3. M-form Structure and Financial Performances 
The purpose of this section is to develop a working hypothesis relating 
the M-form hypothesis to financial performances. It should be noted that the 
present paper does not seek to develop a theory of financial market perfor-
mance and organization structure. Such a theory is a most substantial under-
taking given the present understanding of organization structure. Our purpose 
is more modest. The primary focus is empirical and exploratory. The research 
question is: What impact if any does the M-form structure have relative to a 
functional structure on the financial performance of a firm? In support of 
this question a working hypothesis was developed. 
We are largely in agreement with Armour and Teece that abnormal returns 
will be capitalized into the value of a firm's securities at a rapid pace. As 
a result it would be difficult, but not impossible, to isolate and measure 
these returns. Isolating these returns would become increasingly difficult as 
the M-form structure diffused since the participants in the capital markets 
would be likely to anticipate adoption and its impact at an early point rela-
tive to actual adoption. 
However the basic characteristics ascribed to the M-form structure sug-
gest that they may alter the nature of the market trade-off between risk and 
return. In particular two characteristics ascribed by Williamson would seem 
to potentially be capable of altering the risk and return perceptions of the 
market: (1) superior information and control techniques and (2) the separa-
tion of strategic and operating decision-makings. 
The basic nature of risk is uncertainty about the future value of some 
variable. For a firm as a whole or a division of a firm salient variables 
would include profits, cash flow, competitor moves and responses, future de-
mand, production costs, etc. To the extent that the superior information 
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techniques ascribed to the M-form structure can reduce uncertainty, risk can 
obviously be reduced. Furthermore, this reduction of risk should ultimately 
be reflected in the cash profit stream of the firm since the lessened uncer-
tainty should result in more timely and better decisions. The superior con-
trol techniques should display the same characteristics since they imply the 
improved ability of top management of the firm to monitor performance of busi-
nesses and managers and hence make corrections (i.e., intervene) in a timely 
fashion. 
The separation of strategic and operating decision-makings should also 
have impact on the riskiness of the firm. Without, this separation what char-
acteristically occurs is that immediate operating decisions displace manage-
ment att~ntion from the less immediate but more critical strategic decisions 
regarding capital allocation. Delays in making strategic decisions, many of 
which have long implementation horizons, (e.g., establishment of a manufactur-
ing facility in a low-wage country) can significantly increase the riskiness 
of the firm's cash profits. Separation allows both classes of problems to be 
dealt with more effectively and more appropriately. 
So far the argument has been that some basic characteristics of the M-
form structure in equilibrium result in a reduction of the variability of cash 
profits. Furthermore, since Beaver, Kettler and Scholes (1970) showed that 
the variance of a firm's accounting returns was related to its systematic 
risk, a reduction of a firm's systematic risk should also be associated with 
the adoption of the M-form. This conclusion was adopted as a working hypoth-
esis. 
4. Methodology 
The evaluation and comparison of any investment or financial performance 
cannot be based on the average returns alone. To provide a more proper basis 
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for comparison among investment alternatives an investment performance measure 
must combine risk measures with returns, because participants in capital mar-
kets are generally risk averse and because risk differs among various invest-
ment types. 
The methodology for performance evaluation employed in this study is 
founded on Markowitz's (1952) pioneering work in portfolio theory. The con-
cepts of portfolio diversification and efficiency developed by Markowitz are 
the basis of modern capital market theory. Based on this successive work, it 
is generally accepted that an efficient portfolio must have the highest ex-
pected return for a given level of risk or the lowest level of risk for a 
given level of expected return. Therefore, to assess a proper measure of in-
vestment performance, the realized average return of a portfolio over a given 
time period must be adjusted for the risk of the returns in the portfolio over 
the same time period. 
Total risk and market risk are two commonly used measures of risk in the 
evaluation of financial performance. The total risk of a portfolio is usual-
ly measured by the standard deviation of returns; while the market risk is 
measured by the beta coefficient (see discussion of the capital asset pricing 
model below) esti~ated for the security or portfolio. This coefficient, in 
turn, is measured by the covariance of the portfolio and market returns, 
divided by the variance of the market return. Beta indicates the sensitivity 
of the return with respect to the movement of the return on the market port-
folio. 
Based on Markowitz's mean-variance portfolio analysis, Sharpe (1966) de-
rived the reward-to-variability index for investment performance evaluation. 
The Sharpe index of performance is defined as the ratio of the average excess 
return over a given period to the standard deviation of the excess returns, 
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where excess returns are usually defined as the extent to which returns on a 
given investment exceed the risk-free rate of interest. This index is defined 
as follows: 
-R· - Rf S I = _J"---~ 
where SI = the Sharpe index of performance; 
Rj = the average return on security or portfolio j; 
Rf = the risk-free rate of interest; 
(1) 
aj = the standard deviation of excess returns on security or portfolio 
j. 
The Treynor index (see Treynor, 1965) is similar except it substitutes the 
systematic risk for the standard deviation in the denominator. 
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) extended Markowitz's 
portfolio theory and derived the equili.brium capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM). The CAPM states that, in equilibrium, the expected return on any as-
set or portfolio is related to both the riskless rate of interest and the re-
turn 
where 
on the market portfolio as follows: 
E(Rj) = Rf + Bj[E(Rm) 
- Rf]' (2) 
R· J = the random rate of return on the jth asset or portfolio; 
Rm = the random rate of return on the market portfolio; 
Bj = Cov (Rj, Rm)/Var (Rm), the beta coefficient or systematic risk of 
the jth asset or portfolio. 
Based on the CAPM shown in Equation (2), Jensen (1968) developed the 
following ex-post relationship between the actual risk premium on a portfolio 
and that on the market portfolio for the purpose of evaluating investment 
pe rfor mance : 
(3) 
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where I R·t = the excess rate J of return, Rjt - Rft, on asset or portfolio 
j in period t; 
I 
Rmt = the excess rate of return, Rmt - Rft, on the market portfolio in 
period t; 
aj, Bj =the intercept and slope terms, respectively, of a least squares 
regression line; 
Ejt = the random error term with E(Ejt) = 0. 
Alpha (a) in Equation (3) is Jensen's index of performance. A positive 
alpha indicates a superior performance of the investment relative to an unman-
aged portfolio of similar market risk, while a negative alpha will indicate 
the portfolio's inferior performance, given its market risk. 
5. The Data, the Analysis and the Results 
In order to examine how adoption of the M-form organization structure is 
related to a firm's financial performance, Armour and Teece's (1978) sample of 
firms from the oil industry was reanalyzed using capital market data on stock 
returns. Monthly returns for each firm were obtained from the CRSP tapes. 
Adequate returns were only available on this tape for a total of 13 firms out 
of the original sample of 28 petroleum firms. The final sample appears in 
Table 1. 
For each fir~ an initial analysis period was defined as the four years 
immediately before the transition period. During this period a firm was orga-
nized along lines other than the M-form structure. Similarly an M-form analy-
sis period was defined as the four years immediately after the transition to 
the M-form structure. (These three periods for each firm are shown in Table 
1.) This procedure resulted in a wide diversity of time periods among the 
firms for each analysis period. Hence, we are confident that organizational 
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structure effects were not confused with trends in the risk and returns of the 
petroleum industry (i.e., temporal industry effects). For four of the firms 
the M-form analysis period was shortened by stopping with August 1973 since 
shortly thereafter the Arab oil embargo disrupted the petroleum industry and 
substantially altered the riskiness and returns _of the petroleum industry. 
For each of the firms the mean return, the standard deviation of returns, 
the systematic risk, and Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen measures of financial 
performance were estimated. For the regression a value-weighted market index 
was used. Table 2 lists the mean (X), standard deviation (s), and coefficient 
of variation for each firm for both the initial and the M-form periods. Sim-
ilarly, the systematic risk estimates and the R2 for the estimating regres-
sions are shown in Table 3. Table 4 contains the estimates for the Sharpe and 
Treynor indices and the Jensen measure. Table 5 summarizes the average magni-
tudes across _firms of relevant estimates while Table 6 shows the binomial 
probability of the number of increases encountered for each measure in going 
from the initial period to the M-form period. In sum, these tables suggest 
that overall returns, systematic risk and the coefficient of variation decline 
with the introduction of an M-Form organization structure. 
In addition to studying the impact of adopting the M-form structure, the 
performance in equilibrium of a sample of firms using the M-form structure 
versus a sample of firms using the functional structure was studied. For the 
four year period 1961-1965 the sample included four firms using an M-form 
structure and four that were not but were using some form of functional orga-
nization (see Table 7). Tables 7, 8, and 9 compare these two groups of firms 
on the basis of all the measures discussed earlier. The results indicate no 
differences between these two groups of firms. 
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6. Discussion 
Given the small sample size and single industry composition any conclu-
sions must be tentative. However, given the fundamental importance of the 
choice of organization structure in the managerial literature and the lack of 
systematic study of the relationship between organizational structure and fi-
nancial performance, the results can be most useful in structuring new, more 
refined; and powerful hypotheses and empirical investigations. Furthermore, 
the results are suggestive of conclusions that may be fundamentally important 
in furthering our understanding of the economic role of organizational struc-
ture. Hence the results and the related discussion are offered in the hope of 
stimulating further investigation and discussion rather than as a comprehen-
sive and definitive study. 
The evidence in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that average monthly returns de-
cline as a result of adoption of the M-form organization. This is probably 
related to the decline in systematic risk that these tables also suggest. The 
returns caused by movement of the market would decline because of the decline 
of systematic risk and it is probably this component of overall returns that 
are causing them to decline. This explanation is further reinforced in Tables 
5 and 6 because total risk does not seem in general to decline when the M-form 
structure is introduced. 
The association of a decline in systematic risk with the introduction of 
the M-form structure would seem to be the most important result suggested by 
the analysis. This is the result that the working hypothesis developed on the 
basis of the basic properties of the M-form structure as discussed by 
Williamson. One of the most basic implications of this result is that adop-
tion of the M-form structure could be expected to lower the cost of equity and 
hence the cost of capital to the firm. Therefore a firm adopting the M-form 
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structure (assuming that such a structure was appropriate) would be able to 
accept an increased number of investment projects and would have the oppor-
tunity to expand to a larger size than under a functional structure. From an 
economy-wide perspective it would seem that policy should encourage (or at a 
minimum not discourage) the appropriate adoption of the M-form structure, 
since such adoption will stimulate investment and hence employment and 
welfare. 
The fact that the study dealt only with the petroleum industry puts some 
limits on the generalization of results. However, it should also be noted 
that dealing with a single industry does have advantages. In particular the 
potential impact of differential industry effects on the firms' systematic 
risks need not be considered. Furthermore, the impact of adoption of the M-
form structure may vary across industries since the importance of the advan-
tages of the M-form structure may vary across industries. Studies that sep-
arate the industry impact from the firm impact are needed. 
One particular feature of the petroleum industry sample used in this 
study deserves further comment. The petroleum industry is one in which verti-
cal integration is prominant. The firms in the sample are highly vertically 
integrated. Hence the M-form structure will result in divisionalizing the 
vertical chain (e.g., exploration division, marketing division, refining 
division, etc.). However, because it is a vertical chain it will still be 
necessary to coordinate the scale and activities of each stage with the other. 
An appropriate transfer pricing scheme can go a long way toward achieving 
proper coordination. This leaves some doubts in the authors' minds. Can a 
management team be expected to buy or sell outside of the corporation when by 
so doing they may force a reduction in scale of another division even though 
such a reduction is economically valid? We think it rather more likely that 
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there will be a residual bias in favor of inappropriate internal transaction, 
especially when the managers have operated under a functional structure for 
many years prior to adoption of the M-form structure. Such biases will no 
doubt decay over time (the market will insist on this!) but in the interim 
the full potential of the M-form structure is unlikely to be recognized. This 
argues that the results of this study may be somewhat muted. Studies in other 
industries that are not vertically integrated or of horizontally diversified 
or conglomerate firms are likely, we think, to find more dramatic results. 
One of the more bothersome aspect of the results is the failure of the 
analysis summarized in Tables 7, 8, and 9 to find a difference in firms uti-
lizing the M-form structure versus other structures. The very small sample 
sizes are likely to be playing a role but another explanation can also be ad-
vanced. It may be that during the diffusion of the M-form structure that 
early adopters (those in our sample with the M-form structure during 1961-
1965) were sorely in need of the performance improvement associated with the 
structure, while later adopters (those that did not utilize the M-form struc-
ture during 1961-1965) were performing satisfactorily under the functional 
structure during the early diffusion period. In other words firms adopt the 
M-form structure in response to the pressures of poor performance. This is a 
researchable question worthy of further study. 
This paper has sought to expand on the work of Williamson (1970, 1975, 
1981), Armour and Teece (1978), Teece (1981), and Steers and Cable (1978) to 
develop a tentative hypothesis about the relationship between organizational 
structure and financial performances. The results suggest that the M-form 
structure can lower the systematic risk of a firm. This tentative conclusion 
deserves further study using other industries and larger samples. The manage-
rial literature has generally emphasized the importance of organizational 
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structure while the literature of financial economics has concentrated on fi-
nancial performances • . The works of Williamson (1970, 1975, 1981) are sugges-
tive of possible connections between the two. The current paper aims to 
establish a tentative empirical linkage that will stimulate further studies. 
Table 1 
Performance Measurement Periods 
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Belco Petroleum 








Standard Oil (California) 
Sun Col'!'lpany 











































Return Statistics (All Firms) 
Initial Period M-Form 
X s I i I x s I i I 
Ashland Oil .0236 .0470 2.008 .0133 .0796 5.985 
Bel co Petroleum .0288 .1063 3.691 -.0117 .1235 10.556 
Union Oil of California .0192 .0534 2.781 .0141 .0710 5.035 
Cities Service .0132 .0410 3.106 .0052 .0715 13.750 
Exxon .0039 .0474 12.154 -.0001 .0949 494.000 
Getty Oil .0173 .1204 5.919 -.0044 .0912 20.727 
Gulf Oil .0279 .0749 2.684 .0089 .0577 6.483 
Marathon Oil .0083 .0749 R.980 .0118 .0506 4.288 
Mobil Oil .0073 .0123 1.685 .0169 .0525 3.106 
Occidental Petroleum .0477 .1352 2.834 -.0146 .0990 6.781 
Standard Oil (California) .0189 .0488 2.582 .0149 .0554 3.718 
Sun Company .0180 .0473 2.628 .0038 .0549 14.447 
Standard Oil (Indiana) .0126 .0603 4.786 .0176 .0597 3.392 
Table 3 
Market Model Regression Estimates (All Firms) 
Initial Period M-Form 
B R2 a R2 
Ashland Oil .9669 .29 .7R69 .18 
Bel co Petroleum 1.5990 .26 1.8010 .37 
Union Oil of California 1.1051 .15 • 7282 .39 
Cities Service .6007 .27 .5159 .10 
Exxon 1. 0722 .ss .6295 .23 
Getty Oil 1.7587 .34 1.5527 .45 
Gulf Oil I. 4911 .44 .8876 .19 
Marathon Oil 1.3137 .33 .6924 .13 
Mobil Oil .9327 .35 .6917 .28 
Occidental Petroleum 1. 3771 .08 1.5427 .52 
Standard Oil (California) 1.0926 .48 1.2800 .62 
Sun Company .5761 .12 .564R .10 
Standard Oil (Indiana) 1.3700 .51 .9361 .32 
Table 4 
Perfo~ance Measures (All Firma) 
Initial Period M-Fo~ 
Sharpe Treynor Jensen Measure Sharpe Treynor Jensen Meaeure 
Index Index (SiROificance) Index Index (Shnificance) 
Ashland Oil 0.433 0.0213 .015 0.115 0.0117 .005 
(.012) c. 712) 
Belco Petroleum 0.236 0.0156 .017 -0.131 -o.0090 -.018 
(.219) (.205) 
Union Oil of California 0.169 0.0109 .007 0.296 0.0216 .011 
(.381) (.126) 
Cities Service 0.256 o. 0175 .007 0.007 0.0010 .ooo 
( .181) (.962) 
Exxon 0.040 0.0017 -.007 -0.006 -o.ooo5 .ooo 
(.164) (.977) 
Getty Oil 0.152 0.0090 -.003 -0.071 -o.0042 -.013 
(. 826) (.192) 
Gulf Oil 0.341 0.0173 .005 0.123 0.0080 -.005 
(.554) (.527) 
Marathon Oil 0.084 0.0048 -.004 0.172 0.0126 .005 
.636) (.475) 
Mobile Oil 0.104 0.0060 -.004 0.279 0.0213 .011 
(.518) (.110) 
Occidental Petroleu~ 0.328 0.0321 .037 -0.195 -o.0125 -.019 
(.067) (.062) 
Standard Oil (California) 0.362 0.0162 .005 0.237 0.0103 .ooo 
(.346) (.947) 
Sun Company o. 311 0.0253 .011 0.005 0.0005 -.005 
(.097) (.646) 
Standard Oil (Indiana) 0.191 0.0084 -.009 0.255 0.0163 .007 
(.173) (.325) 
Table 5 
Average Performance Measure 
Initial Period M-Form 
X 0.0190 0.0058 
... 0.0669 0.0739 s 
... 
B 1.739 0.0970 
Sharpe Index 0.231 0.008 
Treynor Index 0.0143 0.006 
Table 6 
Shift in Measures from Initial Period to M-Forl'l (All Firms) 
Measure Number of Increases/Decreases Binomial Probability! 
-X 3 (increases) .046 
s 5 (decreases) .290 
'~' 2 (decreases) .011 3 (increases) .046 
Sharpe Index 4 (increases) .133 
Treynor Index 4 (increases) .133 
lThis is the cumulative binomial probability of this number or fewer 
increases/decreases given that an a priori probability of 0.5 is assigned to 
an increase or a decrease. 
Table 7 
Return Statistics (1961-1965) 
X s 
Not M-Form Structure 
Ashland Oil .0200 .0484 
Sun Company .0110 .0390 
Occidental .0263 .1005 
Cities Service .0126 .0414 
Belco Petroleum .0161 .0654 
M-Form Structure 
Getty Oil .1092 .0931 
Gulf Oil .0136 .0507 
Standard Oil (Indiana) .0167 .0563 
Standard Oil (California) .0145 .0399 
Mobil Oil .0198 .0497 
Averages 
Not M-Form .0172 .0589 
M-Form .0167 .0579 
Table 8 
Market Mode 1 Regression Estimates (1961-1965) 
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Performance Measures (1961-1965) 
Sharpe Treynor Jensen Measure 
Index Index (Significance) 
Not M-Form Structure 
Ashland Oil 0.362 0.0206 0.010 
( .051) 
Sun Company 0.218 0.0188 0.005 
(.332) 
Occidental 0.231 o. 0115 0.008 
(.735) 
Cities Service 0.244 0.0166 0.005 
(.304) 
Belco Petroleum 0.203 0.0160 0.003 
(.802) 
Average 0.251 0.0167 
M-Form Structure 
Getty Oil 0.179 0.0104 0.003 
(.744) 
Gulf Oil 0.219 o. 0118 0.03 
(.548) 
Standard Oil (Indiana) 0.250 0.0180 0.11 
(.059) 
Standard Oil (California) 0.300 0.0217 0.007 
(.126) 
Mobil Oil 0.345 0.0240 0.008 
(.261) 
Average 0.258 0.0172 
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